{ "engagement_id": "DSCO-SEC-2026-10-06-02", "accountable_lead": "Arthur Colle", "executed_by": "Codex-assisted automated test runner", "function": "Research & Engineering - Offensive Security Testing", "start_utc": "2026-10-06T22:39:12.707610+00:00", "end_utc": "2026-10-06T23:39:12.707610+00:00", "start_local": "2026-10-06T18:39:12.707610-04:00", "end_local": "2026-10-06T19:39:12.707610-04:00", "targets": "Owned Tool Management API engineering checkout, in-process ASGI clients and controlled execution fixtures", "excluded": "Production endpoints, third-party systems, live model calls, real secrets, customer data, denial of service and sandbox-escape execution", "data_handling": "Synthetic identities; inert tokens and generated RSA test keys; substituted JWKS and execution transport; temporary DuckDB and in-memory stores. Only sanitized outcome details are published.", "revision": "d9e542700deba3380cb2bcebe0a9a15903c8bdcf", "working_tree": "Existing uncommitted engineering changes retained; selected source files hashed before and after execution.", "source_sha256": { "src/tool_management/api/tools_api.py": "09dd156513b518b5c8317346e6f0a98f83c77728528d340f21cff05f79192018", "src/tool_management/api/user_routes.py": "134823b14baa1735c378e44d1a5261314423459358208998d71f84adc84e3fa0", "src/tool_management/auth/unified.py": "924c0e5e110857ac7f42d2fd4f853c57699b33ed46e11bf2352eee82160a7b72", "src/tool_management/oauth.py": "c7062486ac13c548a4cfd2718cfe0202522f1fc6c5398b094bd24f352b014604", "src/tool_management/persistence/oauth_store.py": "9195c596b2c850545683c3fb9be1576b4a4edf00d503919326ac5e61bed58f58", "src/tool_management/services/backend_policy.py": "3e00e656f8b7455d935abe1897c797450a68e6102df7651f7eb4eb869d1e75c8", "tests/test_canonical_identity_authority.py": "3b2dad374090f69d671759ef6b727fde3b48bf5a0c4e5b707681f1bac0b3ed54", "tests/test_customer_mcp_oauth.py": "d88280bbfca8c956bd14597b8d9605bcc345d58cff5b779989eeb1a1b086fd6d", "tests/test_oauth_security.py": "da05c13bc247c5dd8fc7b18172ce8aaedca0e55e9afacce0e52c38fc2b29b65a", "tests/test_private_native_boundaries.py": "8302ada223afc6a3aeff8ea772f2bc2c6bd7cd7b371fadd42b8f6a9f828c4dc7" }, "cases": [ { "id": "retired_identity_paths", "file": "tests/test_canonical_identity_authority.py", "test": "test_retired_post_paths_never_read_or_mutate_identity_stores", "attempt": "Submit signup, login, local-key rotation and retired OAuth operations", "expected": "410 responses; no local credential-store access, tokens, redirects or sentinel disclosure", "number": "A01", "checks": 12, "status": "PASS", "observed": "410 responses; no local credential-store access, tokens, redirects or sentinel disclosure" }, { "id": "redirect_authority", "file": "tests/test_canonical_identity_authority.py", "test": "test_metadata_and_frontdoors_use_fixed_central_authority", "attempt": "Supply an untrusted redirect destination to account entry paths", "expected": "Fixed canonical authority and account redirect; no cookie issued", "number": "A02", "checks": 1, "status": "PASS", "observed": "Fixed canonical authority and account redirect; no cookie issued" }, { "id": "org_confusion", "file": "tests/test_canonical_identity_authority.py", "test": "test_two_people_in_same_idp_org_do_not_share_a_customer_account", "attempt": "Reuse a shared identity-provider organization ID as a customer account", "expected": "401/403 denial and no stored secret exposure", "number": "A03", "checks": 1, "status": "PASS", "observed": "401/403 denial and no stored secret exposure" }, { "id": "cross_tenant_header", "file": "tests/test_canonical_identity_authority.py", "test": "test_explicit_signed_accounts_isolate_existing_tenant_state", "attempt": "Use a valid account token with another account in the selection header", "expected": "Foreign account rejected; permitted account returns its own metadata without raw secrets", "number": "A04", "checks": 1, "status": "PASS", "observed": "Foreign account rejected; permitted account returns its own metadata without raw secrets" }, { "id": "claim_confusion", "file": "tests/test_canonical_identity_authority.py", "test": "test_unbound_or_malformed_account_metadata_fails_closed", "attempt": "Supply malformed, unbound or conflicting account metadata", "expected": "401 denial", "number": "A05", "checks": 9, "status": "PASS", "observed": "401 denial" }, { "id": "identity_constraints", "file": "tests/test_canonical_identity_authority.py", "test": "test_explicit_account_still_requires_verified_identity_and_audience", "attempt": "Use wrong issuer/audience or an expired token with an explicit account", "expected": "401 denial", "number": "A06", "checks": 4, "status": "PASS", "observed": "401 denial" }, { "id": "legacy_token_bypass", "file": "tests/test_canonical_identity_authority.py", "test": "test_static_operator_retained_but_local_keys_and_signed_migration_tokens_denied", "attempt": "Try obsolete local keys, migration tokens and passwords at protected routes", "expected": "Unauthorized forms denied; explicit inert operator control remains separate from tenant identity", "number": "A07", "checks": 1, "status": "PASS", "observed": "Unauthorized forms denied; explicit inert operator control remains separate from tenant identity" }, { "id": "signing_key_substitution", "file": "tests/test_canonical_identity_authority.py", "test": "test_claims_signed_by_untrusted_key_cannot_select_tenant", "attempt": "Sign otherwise plausible account claims with an untrusted RSA key", "expected": "401 denial", "number": "A08", "checks": 1, "status": "PASS", "observed": "401 denial" }, { "id": "oauth_redirect_injection", "file": "tests/test_oauth_security.py", "test": "test_authorize_requires_an_exact_registered_redirect_uri", "attempt": "Supply an unregistered destination through both OAuth authorization requests", "expected": "400 denial and no authorization code created", "number": "A09", "checks": 1, "status": "PASS", "observed": "400 denial and no authorization code created" }, { "id": "authorization_code_replay", "file": "tests/test_oauth_security.py", "test": "test_authorization_code_is_bound_to_its_client_and_not_burned_on_mismatch", "attempt": "Exchange an authorization code using a different OAuth client", "expected": "Wrong client rejected; authorized client can still redeem code", "number": "A10", "checks": 1, "status": "PASS", "observed": "Wrong client rejected; authorized client can still redeem code" }, { "id": "missing_client_secret", "file": "tests/test_oauth_security.py", "test": "test_confidential_client_secret_is_required_for_code_exchange", "attempt": "Exchange a confidential-client code without its secret", "expected": "401 invalid-client denial; correct-secret positive control succeeds", "number": "A11", "checks": 1, "status": "PASS", "observed": "401 invalid-client denial; correct-secret positive control succeeds" }, { "id": "refresh_token_replay", "file": "tests/test_oauth_security.py", "test": "test_refresh_token_is_client_bound_and_bad_attempts_do_not_consume_it", "attempt": "Replay a refresh token with a different client or wrong client secret", "expected": "Invalid grants/clients denied; authorized exchange succeeds and rotates refresh token", "number": "A12", "checks": 1, "status": "PASS", "observed": "Invalid grants/clients denied; authorized exchange succeeds and rotates refresh token" }, { "id": "authorization_state_outage", "file": "tests/test_oauth_security.py", "test": "test_identity_denies_unavailable_authorization_state_and_recovers", "attempt": "Make authorization-store opening, revocation checks or grant checks fail", "expected": "Identity rejected without leaking test tokens/private markers; normal access recovers after restoration", "number": "A13", "checks": 3, "status": "PASS", "observed": "Identity rejected without leaking test tokens/private markers; normal access recovers after restoration" }, { "id": "introspection_outage", "file": "tests/test_oauth_security.py", "test": "test_introspection_denies_unavailable_store_without_claiming_revocation", "attempt": "Make revocation-state lookup unavailable during token introspection", "expected": "503 inactive response without false revocation claim or token/marker leakage", "number": "A14", "checks": 1, "status": "PASS", "observed": "503 inactive response without false revocation claim or token/marker leakage" }, { "id": "revocation_failure", "file": "tests/test_oauth_security.py", "test": "test_revocation_write_failure_is_not_acknowledged_and_can_be_retried", "attempt": "Fail the revocation write then retry after restoring storage", "expected": "Failure not acknowledged as revocation; subsequent revocation succeeds and token becomes inactive", "number": "A15", "checks": 1, "status": "PASS", "observed": "Failure not acknowledged as revocation; subsequent revocation succeeds and token becomes inactive" }, { "id": "control_plane_access", "file": "tests/test_customer_mcp_oauth.py", "test": "test_customer_oauth_cannot_call_control_plane_meta_tools", "attempt": "Request a control-plane analytics tool as a customer identity", "expected": "Application-level tool denial; backend is not called", "number": "A16", "checks": 1, "status": "PASS", "observed": "Application-level tool denial; backend is not called" }, { "id": "private_worker_access", "file": "tests/test_private_native_boundaries.py", "test": "test_customer_cannot_reach_shared_native_state", "attempt": "Bind two customer tenants to 15 private backend identifiers", "expected": "ACCESS_DENIED in all combinations; no transport, circuit-breaker, usage-recording or billing call", "number": "A17", "checks": 30, "status": "PASS", "observed": "ACCESS_DENIED in all combinations; no transport, circuit-breaker, usage-recording or billing call" } ], "exit_code": 0, "completed_at": "2026-10-06T22:39:16.625977+00:00", "source_unchanged": true, "junit_sha256": "2394f981202546b0995e9222e3d904360f299f0c33edb9563470e5a69d0898b0", "tests_passed": 70, "failures": 0, "errors": 0, "skipped": 0, "test_families": 17, "pytest_runtime_seconds": 3.52, "relationship_to_prior_run": "Focused rerun of cases overlapping the earlier 113-test suite; counts must not be added as unique coverage." }